A rentier state is one where the government gets a large share of its revenue from renting or exporting natural resources—especially oil and gas—rather than taxing citizens. Examples in the CED include Iran, Nigeria, and Russia. They matter because that revenue shapes politics and development: economies often lack diversification (Dutch disease), currencies get overvalued, revenues fluctuate with world prices, inequality and corruption rise, and governments feel less accountable to citizens since they don’t rely on taxes (all part of the “resource curse” in LEG-5.A.2). Resource nationalization or tight state control (e.g., Rosneft, NNPC, Pemex examples in LEG-5.A.3) can concentrate wealth and reinforce legitimacy, while privatization can reduce sovereignty and increase inequality (LEG-5.A.4). For AP prep, make sure you can link rentier status to outcomes like weaker democracy and revenue volatility. More on this topic: Fiveable study guide (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN) and practice questions (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

Oil and other natural resources can reshape politics and the economy through the “rentier state” dynamic and the resource curse. When governments get large shares of revenue from oil, they often fund services without taxing citizens, which reduces accountability and can weaken democracy (LEG-5.A.1, LEG-5.A.2h,i). Economically, dependence on one export causes Dutch disease (currency overvaluation, weak diversification), revenue volatility from world prices, and greater inequality (LEG-5.A.2a–e). Politically, states may nationalize resources (Rosneft, Pemex examples) to consolidate control or allow privatization that concentrates wealth (LEG-5.A.3–4). That fuels corruption and reduces incentives to modernize or cooperate internationally (LEG-5.A.2f–g). For AP prep, link these concepts to course countries and use the Topic 5.9 study guide (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN), unit overview (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5), and practice problems (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

Having lots of oil can be called a "resource curse" because, paradoxically, it can hurt long-term political and economic development. Oil-rich rentier states (like Nigeria, Russia, Iran) get huge government revenue from oil, which lets them fund programs—but it also leads to problems listed in the CED: lack of economic diversification (Dutch disease), dependence on volatile world prices, currency overvaluation, greater wealth inequality, and more corruption. Governments that don’t rely on taxes from citizens often face less accountability and weaker democratic pressures, which can reinforce authoritarian rule. States may nationalize resources to capture revenue (Pemex, Rosneft, NNPC), but that can concentrate wealth and power. For the AP exam, be ready to explain these causal links (LEG-5.A.1–A.3) in FRQs and use country examples. Review the Topic 5.9 study guide (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN) and practice questions (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

All three are rentier states—depend heavily on oil/gas revenue—but they show different political control and outcomes. - Iran: State-owned energy sector is tightly controlled by the Islamic Republic and used to fund programs and regime security. Natural gas/oil revenue is nationalized, which helps legitimacy but limits diversification and fuels corruption (CED LEG-5.A.1–3; study guide: https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN). - Nigeria: Oil production involves powerful foreign MNCs and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Strong foreign influence, weak state capacity, regional/ethnic conflict over resources, and chronic corruption show classic resource-curse effects (CED LEG-5.A.2, LEG-5.A.3b). - Russia: The state (under Putin) exerts centralized control over big firms (e.g., Rosneft), concentrating wealth and political power. Revenue centralization reinforces authoritarian control and limits accountability (CED LEG-5.A.3c). For AP comparison practice, use Unit 5 resources (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5) and try practice questions (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

Oil-rich countries often have more corruption because of the “rentier state” and the resource curse. When a government gets huge revenue from oil (rent), it doesn’t need to tax citizens, so leaders feel less accountable and oversight weakens. Big oil money also concentrates wealth and power (e.g., nationalized companies like Pemex or Rosneft), which creates opportunities for bribery, patronage, and embezzlement. Other effects—Dutch disease, price volatility, and focus on one export—stunt economic diversification and strengthen elite capture of rents. Authoritarian control of oil firms or foreign MNC influence can reinforce corruption and reduce cooperation with international courts (CED LEG-5.A.1–A.4). For the exam, use this language (rentier state, resource curse, Dutch disease) and examples like Nigeria, Russia, or Mexico in FRQs. Review Topic 5.9 on Fiveable for a concise study guide (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN) and try practice questions (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

Relying on oil exports turns a government into a rentier state: it gets big revenue from oil rather than taxing citizens. When leaders don’t need tax money, they lose the accountability link—citizens can’t “pay to ask” for better services or representation, so governments feel less pressure to respond. Oil wealth also fuels corruption, patronage, and centralized control (wealth concentration, nationalized firms like state oil companies), so elites can buy loyalty or repress opposition instead of earning consent. That creates weak civil society, fewer democratic incentives, and sometimes the resource curse (Dutch disease, lack of diversification, volatility). For AP Comp Gov, this maps directly to LEG-5.A (rentier states, resource curse, lack of accountability) and is a common FRQ concept—review the Topic 5.9 study guide for clear examples (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN). For extra practice, check unit review and practice problems on Fiveable (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5; https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

Natural resources can help a country get rich, but they can also hurt democracy—that’s the “resource curse” or rentier state problem (CED LEG-5.A). When a government gets a sizable percentage of revenue from oil/gas, it can fund programs without taxing citizens, which reduces accountability and incentives for democratic responsiveness. You also get Dutch disease (currency overvaluation, weak other industries), boom–bust volatility from world prices, concentrated wealth, more corruption, and sometimes nationalization or heavy state control that centralizes power (see examples: Mexico/Pemex, Russia/Rosneft, Nigeria’s oil). Those outcomes make political competition, economic diversification, and citizen oversight harder—so natural resources can undermine democracy even while raising living standards. For AP prep, know LEG-5.A’s keywords (rentier state, resource curse, Dutch disease) and country examples; review the Topic 5.9 study guide (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN) and practice questions (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

When a country nationalizes its oil industry (like Mexico did with Pemex in 1938), the state takes ownership and control of production and revenue. That can boost government income and political legitimacy because oil rents fund programs without taxing citizens (rentier state effects). But it also raises risks from the resource curse: less economic diversification, currency overvaluation, volatile revenues tied to world oil prices, rising inequality, and greater corruption or concentrated wealth. Nationalization increases government control and can reduce foreign influence—but it can also create inefficiency if the state lacks expertise or incentives to modernize. Mexico later allowed private investment in Pemex to attract capital and technology, showing one policy response. This topic is tested under LEG-5.A on the AP exam; review the CED keywords and consequences in the Unit 5 study guide (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN). For more practice, check the unit overview (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5) and thousands of practice questions (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

Countries decide based on trade-offs between revenue, control, and capacity. Letting foreign multinationals (MNCs) operate can bring investment, tech, and quick income—useful if the state lacks expertise or needs cash fast. But it reduces government control, can increase wealth inequality, and risks loss of sovereignty (privatization consequences in the CED). Nationalizing resources gives the state revenue and political control (seen with Pemex changes, Rosneft, Nigerian NNPC), which can bolster legitimacy but also create rentier dynamics and the “resource curse”: less economic diversification, volatile revenues, corruption, and weaker accountability. Political choices depend on capacity, regime goals (e.g., consolidate power vs. attract FDI), and public pressure. For AP exam points, link this to rentier-state outcomes and nationalization vs. privatization consequences (LEG-5.A.1–5.A.4). For a compact review, see the Topic 5.9 study guide (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN) and practice questions (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

Putin concentrates wealth by centralizing control of the oil and gas sector—nationalizing or bringing big firms (like state-owned Rosneft) under Kremlin-friendly managers and using oil revenue to reward allies. That turns resource rents into political patronage: profits flow to the state and to a narrow elite instead of being broadly invested or taxed, which increases wealth concentration, corruption, and inequality (CED LEG-5.A.2 e, g). Because Russia is a rentier state, the government relies on oil rents, so it avoids accountable taxation and weakens democratic pressures (LEG-5.A.2 h, i). For AP use: cite Russia as an example of centralized control over natural resources producing wealth concentration (LEG-5.A.3.c) when answering FRQs on the resource curse. For a focused review, see the Topic 5.9 study guide (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN) and practice questions (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

Privatizing natural resources vs keeping them government-owned affects politics and development in clear ways. Privatization reduces state control and can attract foreign investment and efficiency, but it often increases wealth inequality, risks loss of sovereignty to MNCs, and can amplify corruption and elite capture (CED: LEG-5.A.4). State ownership (nationalization) gives governments revenue and political control—useful for legitimacy—but can create rentier states dependent on one export, encourage the resource curse (Dutch disease, revenue volatility, weak diversification), and lower accountability since leaders don’t rely on citizen taxes (CED: LEG-5.A.1–2, LEG-5.A.3). Examples: Pemex’s partial opening, Rosneft’s centralized control, and Nigeria’s NNPC show different tradeoffs. This topic shows up on MC/FRQ items about economic development, corruption, and state capacity—so know terms like rentier state, Dutch disease, and oil revenue volatility. For a quick review, see the Topic 5.9 study guide (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN), the Unit 5 overview (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5), and practice questions (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

China and Nigeria handle resource ownership very differently. China tightly nationalizes and controls key resources through state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—the central government (and the Communist Party) runs resource firms, uses revenue to fund development, and keeps political control (fits CED’s nationalization example). Nigeria, by contrast, is a rentier state where oil production relies heavily on foreign MNCs and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); that mix gives multinational corporations big influence and creates volatility, corruption, and weak diversification (the “resource curse” outcomes in LEG-5.A.2 and LEG-5.A.3). In short: China = centralized state-owned control, more political consolidation; Nigeria = dependence on oil, MNC power, and greater revenue fluctuation and accountability problems. Good to reference this topic’s study guide for AP review (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN) and try practice questions (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government) for FRQ prep.

Start with a clear thesis: e.g., “The resource curse often undermines political development by creating rentier states with weak accountability, corruption, and limited economic diversification.” Outline: define rentier state/resource curse (CED LEG-5.A.1–2), then 3 body paragraphs each linking one mechanism to political outcomes with specific evidence. Use one paragraph on fiscal/political effects (taxation gap → lack of accountability, weaker civil society; cite Nigeria/Russia examples), one on economic effects (Dutch disease, lack of diversification, currency overvaluation → social inequality; cite Iran/Mexico), and one on governance effects (nationalization vs. privatization, state control of oil companies, corruption, absence of democracy; cite Rosneft, Pemex, NNPC). Tie each piece of evidence to political development (legitimacy, accountability, democratization). Conclude by weighing counterarguments (resources can fund services/legitimacy) and rebutting with evidence of volatility and corruption (LEG-5.A.2c,g,h,i). For AP FRQ practice, follow Argument Essay rubric: thesis, 2+ country examples, reasoning, and respond to alternate view. Use the topic study guide for review (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN) and more unit resources (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5). For extra practice, try Fiveable practice problems (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

Because oil rents give big, quick government revenue, leaders often focus on the profitable export sector instead of building other industries—that’s the rentier-state/resource curse pattern in the CED. Three big reasons countries don’t diversify: 1) Dutch disease—oil inflows overvalue currency and make manufacturing uncompetitive; 2) political incentives—governments get revenue without taxing citizens, so they don’t need broad-based economic reforms and may prefer short-term payouts or patronage; 3) institutional problems—volatility, corruption, and state control of resources (nationalization or concentrated ownership) concentrate wealth and block private-sector growth. These factors also reduce accountability and slow modernization (CED LEG-5.A.1–5.A.4). This is a common FRQ/multiple-choice topic in Unit 5; review the Topic 5.9 study guide for examples and practice (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN). More unit review and 1000+ practice problems are at the Unit 5 page and practice hub (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5; https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).

Mostly it comes down to how oil/gas money is collected and used. In rentier states the government gets large revenues from exporting resources instead of taxing citizens, so leaders don’t need broad-based accountability and can concentrate wealth (CED: “increasing disparity between rich and poor,” “wealth concentration”). A few specific mechanisms: lack of economic diversification (jobs and investment stay in the oil sector), Dutch disease/overvalued currency that hurts other exports, volatile revenue swings that benefit elites who grab windfalls, and higher corruption or state capture (nationalized or privatized resource firms can funnel wealth to insiders). Privatization can make inequality worse if elites buy assets. All of this reduces incentives to build broad employment or social programs, widening the gap. For AP review, see the Topic 5.9 study guide (https://library.fiveable.me/ap-comparative-government/unit-5/impact-natural-resources/study-guide/asUKEo6gLBPoaAnvCgPN) and practice questions (https://library.fiveable.me/practice/ap-comparative-government).